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designing for imprisonment: 
ARCHITECTURal ethics and prison 
design
Dominique Moran, Yvonne Jewkes, and  Colin Lorne 
Introduction
Architectural ethics has only begun to consider 
in earnest what it means, in a moral sense, to be 
an architect.1 The academy, however, has yet to 
adequately to explore the ethical problems raised,2 
to evaluate the types of  moral issues that arise, 
and to develop moral principles or moral reasons 
that should guide decisions when encountering 
these moral issues inherent in certain project 
types. This is the case despite the practice of  
architecture entailing “behaviours, our choices 
of  which may be illuminated by ethical analysis.”3 
Although distinguishing practice from product 
allows ethical critique of  the practice involved in 
designing buildings, and recognises the significance 
of  the architect’s moral agency, there remains very 
little empirically-based understanding of  how the 
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architect, once identified as a moral agent, operates as such, and still less 
about the circumstances in which ‘professional’ conduct may be at odds 
with ‘ethical’ behaviour. 
   Architects encounter moral dilemmas in everyday practice, in designing 
buildings to address clients’ briefs. Although they may undertake moral 
consideration when accepting or declining commissions, analyzing 
this process is in its infancy in architectural and ethical scholarship, 
consequently little is known about how architects balance moral concerns 
against the need for profitable work. Although McNeill has characterised 
the architects’ refrain ‘if  we didn’t design it, someone else would’ as a 
“worrying abdication of  ethical responsibility,”4 it could alternatively be 
viewed as exhibiting direct moral concern, that if  they themselves do not 
undertake a particular commission, another architect (or possibly non-
architect) would, and possibly with much worse consequences, under what 
Wisor has termed the “moral problem of  worse actors.”5 
     Prison design, as a building type, thrusts the ethical role of  the architect 
sharply into focus. Design is a key element in prison modernisation 
programmes, and a staple for many firms. But architects’ involvement is 
not without controversy. The problematic nature of  prisons themselves, 
(their questionable effectiveness in deterring criminal behaviour or 
enabling rehabilitation, and the ethically dubious practices which may 
take place within them), has meant that the legitimacy of  incarceration 
is continually debated. As physical objects of  the carceral estate, prison 
design offers a compelling ‘test case’ for how the role of  the architect can 
be legitimately conceived as ethical. 
     It seems little progress has been made since Banham registered his 
concern that the architecture profession acts as a “black box,”6 drawing 
and making objects rather than designing in relation to social and ethical 
issues. Although the profession readily assumes responsibility for aesthetic 
design of  buildings as commodity-objects, as well as legal obligations 
surrounding delivery, architects as professionals are more uncertain about 
their moral responsibilities towards those who inhabit or are affected 
by their buildings.7 To counter the ‘black box’ mentality Jeremy Till has 
called for architects to deploy architectural intelligence as responsible 
agents concerned less with the production of  abstract objects, and more 
with their role in enabling wider social processes, thereby engaging their 
ongoing complicity with the social consequences of  their actions.8
The ethics of architecture and the built environment
Considering what sorts of  conceptions about architectural ethics might 
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prove effective in allowing us to gain some 
perspective on the ethics of  prison design requires 
us to review previous thought on this topic. 
Thomas Fisher argued that in his Continental ethics, 
Karsten Harries treated architecture “primarily 
as a product, not a practice,” resulting in an ethical 
perspective “that attaches moral values and their 
realisation to buildings, not to the people who build 
them”9(our emphasis). Although the relationship 
between ethics and aesthetics has long preoccupied 
scholars of  architectural ethics, as evidenced by 
Wasserman et. al.’s assertion that “a building’s 
aesthetic embodiment is a part of  its virtue, its ethical 
value,”10 in creating buildings which are aesthetically 
pleasing, there may be a tendency to equate their 
beauty with notions of  their healthiness, sociability, 
democracy, sustainability and social justice, just as 
there is sometimes an assumption that buildings 
which are less aesthetically pleasing are somehow 
‘worse’ on these counts. However, Fisher described 
the attachment of  moral value to buildings as 
a form of  “mysticism;”11 a building might be 
“inhumane in that it is bleak and uninhabitable. 
It does not follow, nor is it intelligible to suggest, 
that the building itself  has inhumane values.”12 It 
is, he argued, on the basis of  this misassignment of  
values that Harries offered an ‘impossible vision’ of  
artefacts reflecting values without the moral input 
of  the individual (moral) agents who created them. 
Fundamentally, Harries’ approach failed to recognise 
the significance of  the architect’s moral agency in 
the practice of  architecture. Fox concurred that 
the built environment is not an appropriate focus 
of  moral concern; the “non-rational, non-sentient, 
non-living, non-self-organising, non-self-renewing, 
built environment is not... of  moral consequence 
in its own right.”13 He continued: “questions 
regarding built environments should only enter into 
moral discussion in so far as these environments 
are considered to matter to, impact upon, or in 
some way affect, those kinds of  beings or entities 
 fisher 
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in respect of  which we think we have direct moral obligations.”14 
    This urge to focus on architectural practice and the moral agency of  the 
architect points up an important distinction between ‘architecture’ and the 
practice thereof, with both Fisher and Fox having argued that philosophical 
ethicists have not yet adequately explored the ethical problems posed by 
architectural practice. Instead, most of  the attention has been confined to 
such legal considerations as intellectual property and to responsibilities to 
clients; core elements of  business ethics for the design of  any building, 
not just a prison, and equally applicable to architects, building contractors, 
and any other professionals involved in design and construction. Fisher, 
however, claimed that architecture merits its own branch of  applied ethics, 
arguing that it has special issues as a consequence of  the idiosyncrasies 
which distinguish it from the arts, sciences and social practices. Previous 
attempts to address architectural ethics have, he argued, failed to 
produce worthwhile outcomes. The way to identify architectural ethics, 
he contended, is to “place architectural practice, and thus the architect 
as moral agent” and not just legal or professional operator, at the centre 
of  focus15 (our emphasis). As Carroll put it, “there can be no question 
that architects as designers of  built environments can use their skills 
for good or ill, morally speaking.”16 The identification of  architectural 
practice, rather than product, as the location of  ethical agency is a useful 
philosophical advancement, but the practical operation of  this agency is 
opaque. Professional architectural codes of  conduct or of  ethics, such 
as those introduced by the Royal Institute of  British Architects (RIBA), 
or the American Institute of  Architects (AIA), are relatively ineffectual 
in relation to the architects’ moral obligations.17 These codes of  conduct 
represent general guiding principles and rules of  conduct which express 
the considered opinion of  the profession primarily on business ethics, 
in part to protect the profession against liability problems. In the main, 
they focus on business, fiduciary, insurance or liability functions. As codes 
of  conduct, these stipulations are rigid and do not facilitate individual, 
flexible ethical choice. Motivation for obedience is driven by compulsion, 
membership requirements and punishment for violation. 
     These codes of  conduct tend to focus on protecting the client (the 
person who procures the services of  the architect) and as a result they 
often appear deficient as vehicles for advancing the greater good. Clients’ 
priorities, however, may be short-term, exploitative, commercial, and 
detrimental to user wellbeing or to environmental concerns. In this case, 
serving the client through fulfilling this kind of  code of  conduct may 
be highly antithetical to achieving these worthwhile goals. While codes 
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contain platitudes towards the environment and 
the public, they contain little incentive beyond 
telling architects to act within the law. Thus, Till’s 
assertion that acting professionally is different from 
acting ethically, and that the two operate according 
to different parameters, makes sense here. 
Professional conduct is determined by adherence 
to various codes, whereas ethical conduct addresses 
the wider responsibilities of  the architect, to those 
“in respect of  which we think we have direct 
moral obligations”18 including those beyond the 
immediate client.
    The omission of  these wider responsibilities 
towards others who stand to benefit or suffer from 
architects’ buildings gains particular poignancy 
when applied to consideration of  those who have 
little say in the matter of  whether or not they 
want to inhabit them.  Thus, ethically motivated 
architects must, at minimum, concern themselves 
with a social ethic extending beyond the short term 
fiscal exchange of  architectural commissions. As 
Till pointed out, “a client may argue that they are 
not paying for an architect to address these broader 
ethics, and an architect may say that the whole idea 
of  wider responsibilities smacks of  idealism”19 The 
point is though, 
that issues of  social ethics are inherent in the design of  
any building, and just to ignore them does not mean 
that they will go away. Better then to face up to them, 
and in this way deal with the tension between the values 
and priorities attached to the professional codes and 
those implicit in social ethics. 20 
By ‘social ethics’, Till meant the ethics concerned 
with social context and social implications, and 
which pertain to a collective vision of  a ‘good’ 
society in contrast to ethics which focus on the on 
the more contractual concerns regarding what we 
owe to one another. Although Till did not refer 
here to any particular circumstance of  architectural 
commissioning in which professional conduct with 
philosophic 
study of...
the design 
of prisons, is 
embryonic
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clients was at odds with ethical behaviour in the social sense, the role of  
architects in designing prison buildings can be beneficially examined in 
exactly these terms. In the remainder of  the paper we therefore consider 
prison design as a test case for the social ethics of  architectural practice.
Architects’ social ethics of prison design
     If  the ethics of  architecture is a nascent philosophical field, then the 
philosophical study of  the practice of  architecture within the correctional 
field, namely the design of  prisons, is embryonic. Philosophical discussion 
of  architectural ethics rarely focuses on any particular type of  building, in 
line with Taylor’s assertion that buildings themselves cannot be the targets 
of  moral criticism: “moral criticism presupposes moral agency, and so is 
only appropriately applied to people and their actions, not to inanimate 
objects.”21 Although judging it appropriate to critique of  the practices 
of  the people involved in designing buildings, he argued that buildings 
as inanimate objects are morally innocent. Having said this, Taylor hints, 
in his demonstration of  this point, at the ethically questionable nature 
of  prisons; “a building constructed for an evil purpose, such as a dungeon, 
might later be used for a good purpose, such as an exhibition space or a 
chapel, and vice versa.”22 (our emphasis) 
     If  for Taylor a dungeon serves an ‘evil purpose’, then he is in accord 
with retired architect and writer Arthur Allen, who surveyed the history of  
architectural scholarship as it pertains to imprisonment. Allen found that 
“the provision of  architectural service to institutions that aggravate rather 
than resolve the problems they are asked to manage is a complex issue 
arising in the operation of  confining buildings.”23 In a survey originating 
with the idealism of  nineteenth century penal institutions, he observed 
that there was no published architectural concern on the subject of  the 
suffering caused by prisons until a discussion in 1973 in the magazine 
Architectural Forum, which urged that “architects consider withdrawal 
from design of  prisons for non-violent inmates.”24 Allen argued that the 
“proposition that architects can and should consider the record of  success 
or failure of  their clients’ intentions and operations is at the heart of  this 
problem.”25 In narrowly observing their internal professional codes of  
conduct, in terms of  integrity, honesty and diligent design in matters 
of  structural safety and so on, some architects still, he argued, pretend 
innocence of  the conflict between professional and social ethics in their 
work. 
     In 1977, Allen began publishing about the moral agency of  architects 
with respect to incarceration. He questioned the architect’s “traditional 
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obedience”26 in the case of  prison building, noting 
that although they built them, architects seldom 
wrote about or discussed prisons. Encouraging 
architects to be more attuned to the prison debate 
of  the time, he argued that 
…if  [the prison debate] concludes that imprisonment 
is unavoidable, then I can agree that decent architecture 
will have its place. If  prisons, however, are found to be 
ineffective instruments of  misery, then architects must 
question their part in the prison business.27 
Addressing the moral agency of  architects, he later 
wrote that “the architectural profession is unusually 
silent, even evasive, concerning the moral character 
of  its clients;”28 and considering the language 
architects use to discuss clientele, and architecture’s 
apparent isolation from social debate, he argued 
that:
If  architects design prison cells, which in their dreadful 
simplicity are designed for solitary confinement, then 
surely architects and architecture are implicated in 
the mental and physical destruction which occurs in 
these cells. If  there is any doubt about the cruelty of  
solitary confinement, or of  imprisonment, I suggest 
that architects read social, rather than architectural, 
criticism.29 
He effectively argued that by using a technical 
jargon to describe buildings, architecture creates 
a professional mystique which avoids making 
reference to the moral or political character of  the 
patrons of  architecture, contributing to what he 
described as “a wide language gap between architects 
and writers on the issue of  imprisonment.”30 
Terms such as ‘good design’, ‘pure, crisp and clean 
design’, and ‘visual logic’, enabled the architect to 
refrain from “comment on the moral and ethical 
character of  captives and captors,” and to “flatter 
the institution with limited moral and ethical 
comment on the nature of  its prison designs.”31 
He also argued that euphemistic language is used 
by architects in public relations terms, in deflecting 
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attention from troubling issues; for example in architectural designs where 
groups of  cells are called ‘villages’ and corridors between ‘villages’ are 
called ‘walks’ or ‘streets’ – labels, through the use of  which, he posited “we 
are only fooling ourselves.”32 He concluded that: 
If  architecture continues to support questionable institutions and movements, and 
to defend them with euphemistic and specially constructed ethical languages, then 
the profession’s part in deception and its self-centred indifference to moral and 
ethical issues cannot be defended on moral and ethical grounds.33 
That the ethics of  the practice of  architecture within the correctional 
field has thus far been largely overlooked by the academy strikes us as 
remarkable. In 2004, ADPSR (Architects/Designers/Planners for Social 
Responsibility) launched a Prison Design Boycott for Alternatives to 
Incarceration in the United States, asking architects and allied professionals 
to refuse prison work. It asked architects to decline death chamber 
and Supermax prison commissions on the grounds of  human rights 
violations. Supermax prisons are considered to inflict torture through 
long-term solitary isolation and the carrying-out of  death sentences, 
which are considered to be prima-facie torture. This pledge campaign was 
not specifically aimed at the American Institute of  Architects [AIA], but 
it asked the AIA to amend its Code of  Ethics and Professional Conduct 
to prohibit the design of  these facilities. Later, in 2013, ADPSR added a 
separate petition campaign asking AIA to amend their Code of  Ethics to 
specifically prohibit the design of  spaces intended for killing, torture, or 
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. “Cruel, inhuman, or degrading” is 
a key human rights standard widely held to include solitary confinement of  
the kinds currently used within the United States, including but not limited 
to Supermax prisons. The campaigns triggered intense media debate but 
in December 2014, the AIA rejected the proposals. Although dialogue 
between AIA and ADPSR continues, the AIA position is essentially that 
ethical decisions rest firmly with architects’ practices, and with individual 
architects . 
     In narrowly observing their internal professional codes of  conduct, 
architects can, Allen argued, pretend innocence of  the conflict between 
professional and social ethics in their work. His suggestion of  pretended 
‘innocence’ perhaps invites an unwarranted scapegoating of  architects, 
hence we argue for a better understanding of  the contextual nature of  the 
constraints architects face in acting in accordance with the moral values 
they may hold. Although we may speculate about these constraints, very 
little is understood of  the socially embedded nature of  ethical stances 
in relation to architectural practice, and the contextual nature of  these 
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stances, for example, in relation to prevailing 
punitive philosophies. Punitive sentiment (i.e. the 
attitudes towards imprisonment widely held in 
a given context), and the nature of  the processes 
through which prisons are built (e.g. privatisation, 
private financing, design and build contracts, 
competitive tendering) may predetermine the 
role of  the architect and the nature of  his or 
her involvement in prison design. In the highly 
incarcerative settings of  the US and UK, architects’ 
reluctance to address these issues may be due to 
the lucrative nature of  projects generated when 
imprisonment is used politically to placate public 
anxiety. In essence, challenging public authorities 
and fellow professionals on substantial moral issues 
may damage business. 
    The commissioning of  prison buildings varies in 
different contexts, shaping the capacity for architects 
to introduce design creativity into the process, 
and defining the nature of  their involvement. In 
order to design with a concern for social ethics in 
mind, architects will need early involvement in a 
building project to creatively engage with and query 
the client’s brief, rather than adopting a narrower 
technical role in relation to predetermined plans. 
Such an approach allows architects to include 
the client as part of  the commission, rather than 
focus only on the building itself, thus enabling 
consideration of  architecture’s social ethics. The 
potential for such an approach, given the various 
financing and contracting processes in place in 
different contexts, may have profound implications 
for architects’ deployment of  moral agency in 
relation to the social context of  imprisonment. 
     In the UK, for example, the Private Finance 
Initiative process means that consortia of  
contractors and architects tender for prison projects 
whose basic design has already been determined 
prior to the tender being offered by the Ministry 
of  Justice, thus minimising architects’ creative 
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input, and perhaps also assuaging their sense of  responsibility for the 
built outcome itself. This process only allows architects to participate as 
providers of  an efficient process with predetermined outcomes. In the 
lower incarceration setting of  Denmark, by contrast, tenders for prison 
commissions ask bidders to deliver their own designs for the prison, ab 
initio, with the result that architects have a much freer hand, and with it, 
a concomitant sense of  responsibility. At the state level in the US, the 
design ab initio system prevails, but designs which appear too ‘lenient’ 
will not be successful: “at the end of  the day, my clients are my clients. 
We’ve been told we can’t make it look too good, because the public won’t 
accept it.”34 It seems only reasonable to assume, then, that architects 
operating in different commissioning environments will see their moral 
responsibilities—as well as their options—differently. In other words, 
architects’ ability to introduce more ‘humane’ elements into prison 
design in Denmark may act to assuage the ethical concerns felt by their 
counterparts in the U. K. If  architects’ ethical concerns are assuaged in this 
way, we believe that it is not necessarily through a form of  the ‘mysticism’ 
of  attaching moral value to a building so roundly critiqued by Fisher but 
through the anticipation of  genuine improvements in people’s lives that 
accrue because of  architects’ actions. Thus, the case of  prison design 
suggests that concern over the ethics of  not only architects’ actions, but 
also the products of  those actions due to their long-term consequences 
over peoples’ lives is not at all misplaced and should be part of  an ethically-
motivated architect’s deliberations. 
     Even the usually ethically-neutral subject of  aesthetics becomes 
morally relevant in the case of  prisons. It may be the case that restrictions 
imposed by clients on the design of  prisons (e.g. predetermined plans 
offered for tender, issues of  ‘public acceptability’ of  designs, tight build 
budgets, preferred/cheaper layouts and finishes) may reduce the appeal 
of  prison design to architects seeking to deliver humane, aesthetically 
pleasing buildings. Conversely, it is possible that architects focus on 
prison aesthetics to the detriment of  concern for the lived experience of  
prisoners. Through the aesthetics of  their prisons, architects communicate 
the purpose of  imprisonment and the relationship between prisons and 
the community.35 Aesthetically bland, functional, and rather nondescript 
exteriors of  recently built UK prisons, for example, may be read as 
indicators of  a loss of  public empathy for prisoners. 
Conclusion: Prison design as architectural ethics in practice
Architecture still lacks its own branch of  applied ethics, in which 
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architectural practice, and the architect as moral 
agent, are focal. Whilst these issues are usually 
considered in rather abstract terms, we argue that 
prison design brings them more clearly into focus, 
enables advancement of  discussion of  the ethics 
of  architecture, and enhanced understanding of  
the ethics of  architectural practice. It does so in 
the context of  the transition from ideal to nonideal 
theory in ethics and political philosophy, describing 
principles for the design of  institutions and the 
conduct of  persons in a moral and political order 
that is realistic, rather than utopian, and that asks 
how long-term ideal goals might be achieved, or 
worked toward, in ways that are morally permissible 
and politically possible as well as likely to be 
effective.36
     With the exception of  McNeill, there are few 
studies which consider how the architect, once 
identified as a moral agent, thinks and operates 
as such, and accordingly we know little about 
the moral issues arising from architecture’s 
idiosyncrasies. Professional codes of  conduct 
are generally expected to address these issues 
but, operating largely to protect the consumer 
procuring architects’ services, and the profession 
against liability, they address business ethics rather 
than issues that arise out of  architects’ design 
function. Learning the declarative form of  the 
professional codes of  conduct cannot address 
the complex ethical demands of  architectural 
practice.37 Ethical conduct addresses social context, 
which exists beyond the short term fiscal exchange 
of  architectural commissions, and involves longer 
term vision. Negotiating these commissions is not 
straightforward. The need to make a profit may 
compromise architects’ ability to act on ethical 
concerns, compelling them to explore nonideal 
situations, the ways in which these dilemmas are 
addressed and worked through in relation to actual 
commissions accepted or declined, as well as any 
derivative duties discharged. 
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     We opened with a question about architects’ negotiation of  their moral 
roles. Tracing the nascent development of  the philosophical field of  
architectural ethics, it is clear that philosophical discussion locates social 
responsibility with the individual architect as a moral agent--a stance 
confirmed both by the comments of  professional architects, and by the 
reluctance of  the AIA to assume any responsibility for the ethical conduct 
of  its members beyond the standard professionalism of  business ethics.
     We argued here that taking prison design as a ‘test case’ enables a more 
grounded understanding of  architects’ navigation of  ethical dilemmas 
beyond professional business practice, dilemmas which require them to 
address their wider responsibilities and to decide to whom, beyond the 
immediate client, they consider themselves to have obligations. In our view 
these obligations extend to both the prisoners who inhabit their buildings 
and suffer incarceration individually, and to a society which bears the 
collective burden of  the economic and social costs of  imprisonment. As 
professional architects’ discussions of  conscience make clear, architects’ 
ethical roles beyond their professional responsibilities remain under-
explored, as evidenced by the lack of  academic debate over the ethical 
role of  the architect in prison design, and despite longstanding discussion 
of  the ethics of  imprisonment itself.
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